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1 In an epigraph to one of the chapters of Felix Holt, George Eliot likens vulgar jokers to a
turkey-cock: “it has a cruel beak,” she writes, “and a silly iteration of ugly sounds…”.1
This paper is about cruel beaks and silly iterations, about verbal aggression and repetition
in George Eliot’s  writings.  In particular,  I’m curious about what seems at  first  like a
stylistic tic, a way she has of fixing on a somewhat odd word or phrase and of repeating it
two or three or more times within the space of a page or two, as if  in the grip of a
transient obsession, then, once attention has been thus drawn to it, dropping it. These
repeatings then remain, like slubs in the weave of silk or linen, as local saliencies, a bit
more opaque than the language around them, rendered slightly silly through iteration.
Moreover,  they  seem  to  crop  up  at  moments  when  another  sort  of  silliness,  the
implausibility of some turn of events in the novel’s plot, is making itself felt. And it is that
relation—between plotting that leaves all notions of verisimilitude behind, and verbal
repetitions that call attention to themselves as oddities—that I shall be considering. I
shall focus on Felix Holt, but I want to begin by looking at an instance from Daniel Deronda
and another from Silas Marner.
2 The word that is repeated in this passage from Daniel Deronda is the word “repeating”: for
reasons that I hope will become clear I want to start with this most thematically loaded
instance, from Eliot’s last novel, at once her wildest and her savviest. In these pages, from
chapter 35, halfway through the novel, Daniel is showing a group of people around the
stately-home-of-England where he was raised,  a mansion described as “a picturesque
architectural outgrowth from an abbey, which had still  remnants of the old monastic
trunk”  (DD 204);  in  the  group  is  Grandcourt,  the  novel’s  aristocratic  villain,  and
Gwendolen, his recent bride, now beginning to regret her choice. They have reached a
cloistered court:
It was a rare example of a northern cloister with arched and pillared openings not
intended for glazing, and the delicately wrought foliage of the capitals seemed still
to carry the very touches of the chisel.
Gwendolen had dropped her husband’s arm [hold onto that chisel and that dropped
arm: we shall need them later, when we turn to Felix Holt] and joined the other
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ladies,  to  whom  Deronda  was  noticing  the  delicate  sense  which  had  combined
freedom with accuracy in the imitation of natural forms.
“I  wonder  whether  one  oftener  leams  to  love  real  objects  through  their
representations,  or  the representations through the real  objects,”  he said,  after
pointing out a lovely capital made by the curled leaves of greens, showing their
reticulated under-side with the firm gradual swell of its central rib. “When I was a
little fellow these capitals taught me to observe, and delight in, the structure of
leaves.”
“I suppose you can see every line of them with your eyes shut,” said Juliet Fenn.
“Yes. I was always repeating them, because for a good many years this court stood
for  me  as  my  only  image  of  a  convent,  and  whenever  I  read  of  monks  and
monasteries, this was my scenery for them.” (DD 475-476)
3 The  narrative  then  turns  back  to  considering  Gwendolen’s  despair  as  she  takes  the
measure of her marriage to Grandcourt,  a marriage she had entered into despite the
knowledge that he had children by a former mistress. She had begun to pay for that
decision on her wedding-night, when she had received a letter from that former mistress
that had sent her into a fit of hysterical shrieking: it is this moment that the narrative
recalls, two pages after Daniel’s comments on representations and real objects:
She had burnt Lydia dasher’s letter with an instantaneous terror lest other eyes
should see it, and had tenaciously concealed from Grandcourt that there was any
other cause of her violent hysterics than the excitement and fatigue of the day: she
had been urged into an implied falsehood. “Don’t ask me—it was my feeling about
everything—it was the sudden change from home.” The words of that letter kept
repeating  themselves,  and  hung  on  her  consciousness  with  the  weight  of  a
prophetic doom. [And here much of the letter, printed in full earlier in the novel, is
repeated,  word for  accusatory  word]:  “I  am the grave in  which your  chance of
happiness is buried as well as mine. You had your warning. You have chosen to
injure me and my children. He had meant to marry me at last, if you had not broken
your word. You will have your punishment. I desire it with all my soul…” (DD 478)
4 “I was always repeating them”; “the words of that letter kept repeating themselves”: we
may not be surprised to find the involuntary and dreaded return of the repressed letter
described  as  a  repeating,  but  to  find  the  word  attached  to  Daniel’s  acts  of  fond
recollection is more arresting. It has the effect of enforcing the resemblance between
these good and bad modes of repetition and of complicating Daniel’s Ruskinian aesthetic.
If  movements  of  love  are  not  natural  responses  to  natural  objects,  but  instead  the
repetitive process of learning “to love real objects through their representations”, then
the ways in which love and mimetic art are related cannot be neatly distinguished from
the ways in which hysterical dread such as Gwendolen’s is bound up in compulsively
repeated images.
5 The architectural details Daniel is so fond of are called “remnants” of the old monastery
(DD 204, 469); elsewhere, Daniel thinks of Grandcourt contemptuously, as “that remnant
of a human being” (DD 456) and the narrator takes a moment to linger on his choice of
that term, quoting it (“His notion of Grandcourt as a ‘remnant’”…) and thus marking it.
Fifteen years earlier, in Silas Marner, the word had been still more tellingly marked and
with no traces of narrative self-consciousness. It appears twice in the novel’s opening
paragraph, first to describe people like Silas, itinerant weavers, “certain pallid undersized
men  who,  by  the  side  of  the  brawny  country-folk,  looked  like  the  remnants  of  a
disinherited race,” then to note the “remnant of distrust” (SM 5) with which they, and all
outsiders, continued to be viewed by the countryfolk. The word then disappears from the
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text for a hundred or so pages, then crops up twice in the same paragraph, in a puzzling
phrase—“the black remnant” (SM 108)—at a crucial articulation of the novel’s plot.
6 Silas Marner tells the story of the integration of a solitary pallid weaver into a community
of  brawny countryfolk,  an integration accomplished by his  taking over the duties  of
raising an infant who had been abandoned by its mother and whose father refuses to
acknowledge  it.  The  plot  must  somehow  contrive  for  the  infant  to  change  hands,
unbeknownst to its natural mother and in a way that strikes Silas as miraculous and
redemptive, for he comes to think of the child as a substitute for the sack of gold coins
that had been stolen from him earlier in the story. How is this exchange to take place and
how  will  it  be  motivated?  The  contrivance  George  Eliot  chooses  is  a  pairing  of
simultaneous and symmetrical lapses into unconsciousness: the baby’s mother, an opium
addict, gets lost in a snowstorm close to Silas’s cottage, takes an overdose and falls asleep,
freezing  to  death  while  her  child  crawls  towards  the  lighted  cottage  and  past  Silas
himself,  who is  shown holding open the  cottage  door and,  in  the  narrative’s  figure,
“arrested […] by the invisible wand of catalepsy” (SM 110), When he awakens from his
trance the child is on his hearth and the process of his domestication as her surrogate
father (or surrogate mother—it isn’t clear which) has begun.
7 In providing further motivating details,  the narrative tells us not only that Silas was
subject to cataleptic fits (that would arrest him, but not invariably at the cottage door!),
but also that “since he had lost his money, he had contracted the habit of opening his
door  and looking out  from time to  time,  as  if  he  thought  that  his  money might  be
somehow coming back to him, or that some trace, some news of it, might be mysteriously
on the road […]” (SM 109); his “habit” is further characterized as “this repetition of an act
for  which  he  could  have  assigned  no  definite  purpose,  and  which  can  hardly  be
understood  except  by  those  who  have  undergone  a  bewildering  separation  from  a
supremely loved object.” The “supremely loved object” is Silas’s gold, which had itself
become  supremely  loved  through  a  process  of  compulsively  repeated  stackings  and
countings of a heap of coins. But that is not all. Silas’s habit of counting his coins is, in its
turn, the outgrowth of yet an earlier, more primordial habit, that of weaving: “he seemed
to weave, like the spider, from pure impulse, without reflection” (SM 16). It is possible to
follow Eliot’s rhetoric back down the line to this imaginary moment of pure impulse, then
back up again, as she describes the process of attachment by which repetitive motion
takes on meaning and impels desire. In the beginning there was weaving; then one of
Silas’s customers pays him in gold:
Now, for the first time in his life, he had five bright guineas put into his hand. […] It
was pleasant to him to feel them in his palm and to look at their bright faces, which
were  all  his  own:  it  was  another  element  of  life,  like  the  weaving  and  the
satisfaction of hunger. (SM 17)
8 “Their bright faces, which were all his own”: does that mean “the guineas all belong to
him?” or “he sees his own face in their bright faces?” Is the point that the process of
attachment  begins  in  this  moment  of  proprietary  reflection,  when  a  shrunken  and
rudimentary self, barely more than a pulsation, a locus of repetition, begins to see itself
as a self in something outside itself? That’s a possible reading, and if it sounds strained at
first it sounds less so a few pages later, where we learn that Silas “would on no account
have  exchanged  those  coins,  which  had  become  his  familiars,  for  other  coins  with
unknown faces” (SM 19).
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9 But there would be no attachment, Eliot suggests,  unless “repetition has bred a want
which is incipient habit,” and the analogy she chooses to illustrate this point is both
gratuitous and revealing:
Gradually the guineas, the crowns, and the half-crowns, grow in a heap. […] Have
not  men,  shut  up  in  solitary  imprisonment,  found  an  interest  in  marking  the
moments by straight strokes of a certain length on the wall, until the growth of the
sum of straight strokes, arranged in triangles, has become a mastering purpose? Do
we not wile away moments of inanity or fatigued waiting by repeating some trivial
movement or sound, until the repetition has bred a want, which is incipient habit?
That will help us to understand how the love of accumulating money grows into an
absorbing passion. (SM 19)
10 Hoarding, in Eliot’s account, turns out not to be based in greed or even need: it is stranger
than that. It is based in idle repetition, something more like an impulse than a desire. And
that repetition is aligned,  oddly,  with the marks made by a writer.  Now, to compare
hoarding and marking makes one kind of sense if the act of marking is seen from the
point of view of prisoners in solitary—they have an obvious interest in recording the
passage of time, in toting up the days or counting them down. But it makes another,
rather different kind of sense if taken from the point of view of an author as one who
inscribes  marks,  an  author  who  may  appear  to  have  been  under  no  obligation  to
introduce anything so writerly at this moment in her text. For Eliot to mark the moment
with an allusion to marking further entangles the thematics of exchange by suggesting
that the unconscious origins of Silas’s attachments lie in a region where rudimentary
writing, impulsive repetition, habit and want are hard to clearly distinguish from one
another, where a self’s identity, its activity or passivity, its relation to exteriorized marks,
its relation to objects, are all being negotiated for the first time and provisionally settled.
11 The upshot of this marking, and of the habits built upon it, is that Silas’s remembered
coins come to serve as the representations of a loved object which will orient his first
bewildered and near-sighted glimpse of the golden-haired child on his hearth. A habit,
then,  a  repeating,  and  a  prolonged  moment  of  unconsciousness,  make  up  Silas’s
contribution to the exchange. Here are the equivalent lines describing the contribution of
the child’s natural mother:
She needed comfort, and she knew but one comforter—the familiar demon in her
bosom; [she is, the previous paragraph tells us, “enslaved” to “the demon Opium”
and she is carrying a phial of it with her] but she hesitated a moment, after drawing
out the black remnant, before she raised it to her lips. In that moment the mother’s
love pleaded for painful consciousness rather than oblivion—pleaded to be left in
aching weariness, rather than to have the encircling arms benumbed so that they
could not  feel  the dear burden.  In another moment Molly had flung something
away, but it was not the black remnant — it was an empty phial. (SM 108)
12 It’s the repetition of that odd periphrastic phrase that’s striking here: what “the black
remnant” denotes is the opiate, a small amount of dark liquid still left in the phial. But
the figurative phrase would not seem to be repressing the literal expression—the word
“opium” is not unspeakable in this novel. Rather the repetition of the figure serves to
mark, as if in black ink, a turning-point in the novel, a fulcrum of implausibility upon
which everything rests.
13 But why should implausibility of plotting be marked in this particular way? An answer is
suggested by a scene a few pages later where the motif of the child leaving its natural for
its adoptive parent is replayed, this time with the baby’s natural father, the Squire’s son
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Godfrey Cass. Godfrey, who, out of prudence or cowardice, cannot acknowledge that he is
the child’s father, is in Silas’s cottage, looking down at the child on the weaver’s lap:
The wide-open blue eyes looked up at Godfrey’s without any uneasiness or sign of
recognition: the child could make no visible audible claim on its father; and the
father felt a strange mixture of feelings, a conflict of regret and joy, that the pulse
of that little heart had no response for the half-jealous yearning in his own, when
the blue eyes turned away from him slowly, and fixed themselves on the weaver’s
queer face, which was bent low to look at them, while the small hand began to pull
Marner’s withered cheek with loving disfiguration. (SM 118)
14 This process, by which Silas is being naturalized as a real, if not a biological father, is
named a “loving disfiguration,” the latter term an expression Paul de Man has taught us
to take seriously—that is, both figuratively and literally—when we come across it in a
text.2 The movement is from the man who is literally the child’s father to the other man
who is at first merely figuratively so, then on to the point where the figurativeness of his
fatherhood disappears, through loving familiarity, and he is her “real” (though still not
her biological) father. We cannot call that third state a literalization, but we can call it a
reduction of the figure, a disfiguration. The process was already at work in the earlier
scene of exchange: the signal of its operation there is Silas’s and Molly’s unconsciousness
and  the  sign  that  we  are  not  to  read  that  unconsciousness  mimetically  but  as  a
disfiguration is the reiterated phrase “the black remnant”. No exchange of objects of love,
the text suggests, no transference, without baleful repetition, without unconsciousness
and without some remnant to mark the unnaturalness, the implausibility, of the process,
and to link that implausibility to the willed—or driven—marking activity of a writer.
15 Like Silas’s daughter, the heroine of Felix Holt—Esther Lyon—has been adopted by a kindly
but poor man; again like her, Esther comes to learn the circumstances of her birth—that
her natural father was a gentleman with a claim to a large estate—and eventually chooses
not to press her claim—to “make no visible audible claim” (SM 118)—but to remain in
decent  poverty.  As  the  novel’s  plot  unfolds,  she  might  easily  be  referred  to  as  the
remnant of a disinherited race; in fact, a cognate, though unusual, noun is applied to her:
she  is,  in  legal  terminology,  technically  a  “remainder-man”,  that  is  a  “person  who
becomes entitled to [an] estate…on termination of [the] rights of [a] precedent estate”.3
How that  term figures in the text—both its  condensed and peculiar  local  occurrence
(three  times  in  the  opening  paragraphs  of  chapter  36  and  nowhere  else)  and  the
resonances it sets up throughout the novel—is what I want to turn to now.
16 Several narrative strands thread through Felix Holt: there is a political plot, involving an
election riot and the subsequent trial and conviction of the novel’s hero for having killed
a man in a scuffle; there is the explicitly tragic story of a woman who sins and suffers the
consequences  of  her  sin,  Mrs. Transome’s  story;  there  is  the  story  of  Esther  Lyon’s
conversion, by Felix Holt, to a life of altruism and service; and there is a tangled tale of
inheritance,  of  claims  on  the  Transome  estate,  in  which  Esther  finds  herself  in  the
position of the remainder-man. This last element of the plot is sufficiently complicated to
warrant an  appendix  in  many  editions  of  the  novel:  in  one  the  editor  patiently
summarizes the workings-out and the legal underpinning of the story while insisting that
“unlike  the  complexity  of  Little Dorrit, or  Bleak House,  the  complexity  of  Felix Holt is
unrelated to the central areas of what the novel is saying”.4 I shall be arguing that the
idea of contrivance—and the intricacies of plot that display that contrivance—are on the
contrary very much to the point.
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17 We know that George Eliot was particularly anxious to get the legal details right, anxious
enough to consult a lawyer friend, with whom she exchanged a series of long, minutely
particularized letters about probable legal scenarios. What she most wanted to be assured
of was that her wish—to make an heiress of her heroine, but only after a long delay—was
consistent with common law. “I should be glad of as large a slice of a century as you could
give me”, she writes to her friend, “but I should be resigned if I could get forty years”.5
She knew that  there were statutes of  limitation which stipulated that  certain claims
would become invalid after certain periods of time, and she needed her heroine’s claim to
remain in force. She needed, that is, for her heroine to be at once disinherited and a valid
claimant. Her friend accommodated her by steering her away from the law of heirship
towards a more recondite set of cases turning on questions of the settlement of an estate,
what has come to be called the law of entail. It was through him that words like “entail”
and “remainder-man” found their way into the text of the novel.
18 Readers of the works preceding Felix Holt can imagine how congenially these words must
have  struck  the  novelist’s  ear:  for  if  “remainder-man”  echoes  the  “remnants”  in
Silas Marner,  “entail”  links itself  at  once with the notion of  consequences,  which had
organized George Eliot’s moral psychology—and her plotting—from the first: “there is
seldom any wrongdoing”, she writes in the opening pages of Felix Holt, “which does not
carry  along  with  it  some  downfall  of  blindly-climbing  hopes,  some  hard  entail  of
suffering…” (FH 10). Still more helpfully, “entail” resonates with intaglio, an engraved
gem, a word that figures significantly in Romola (1863): both derive from the Latin verb
for cutting. And in Felix Holt imagery of cutting, incising, truncating and biting exfoliates
across the pages of the novel, whose diction at moments seems to be governed by another
law of entail: Thou shalt cut! Literal scissors, sabres and pen-knives turn up, a wild little
boy periodically buries his teeth in various people’s arms, while related figures of speech
proliferate—“cutting  a  figure”  for  example  (FH 132),  or  “cutting  [someone]  short”
(FH 41), or a tongue that cut “as cruelly as if it were a sharp-edged blade” (FH 30, 226).
The imagery reaches  in one direction towards  the notion of  hardness,  the resistant,
bruising or wounding quality of steel, as in “some hard entail of suffering”; in another
towards that of maiming, mutilation or castration: in a scene between Mrs. Transome and
her former lover, we read that “every sentence was as pleasant to her as if it had been cut
in her bared arm” (FH 94), then, a few lines later there is an innocuous but awkwardly
managed passage about taking the arm of one’s companion: “Let me take your arm… For
more than twenty years Mrs. Transome had never chosen to take his arm… “Good god!”
said Mrs. Transome, taking her hand from his arm… as she took away her hand, Jermyn
let his arm fall…etc.” (FH 115-116) (It was after reading this that the promixity of a chisel
to a dropped arm in that earlier citation from Daniel Deronda began to sound strange!). A
third mode of association around which these figures cluster is that of oral aggression—
the bite of animals (or of that unpleasant child [FH 94]), the contrasted feebleness of an
old man who must have his food cut for him by a servant (FH 32), but more particularly
the vocalization of one’s will as verbal aggression, the ways in which loud talk, clamor,
even the most soft-spoken, the least clamant of claims of the most legitimate claimant,
can come to stand for an aggressive intent—this, as we shall see, gets drawn into play
(FH 154, 157-59, 217, 247).
19 With this rapidly evoked sense of the verbal texture of the novel in mind, we can return
to  our  particular  claimant,  this  woman who  is  a  remainder-man.  In  chapter 36,  the
current tenant of the estate, Harold Transome, has just learned that a remainder-man
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who might legitimately dispossess him exists, but he does not yet know who that person
is,  and  he  is  turning  over  the  possibility  of  securing  his  interest  by  concealing  the
information he has just received, most particularly from the remainder-man himself.
Nobody would have said that Harold was bound to hunt out this alleged remainder-
man and urge  his  rights  upon him;  on  the  contrary,  all  the world  would  have
laughed at such conduct, and he would have been thought an interesting patient for
a mad-doctor. The unconscious remainder-man was probably much better off left in
his original station…
… [Harold] would not have been disgraced if, on a valid claim being urged, he had
got his lawyers to fight it out for him on the chance of eluding the claim by some
adroit  technical  management.  Nobody off  the  stage  could  be  sentimental  about
these things, or pretend to shed tears of joy because an estate was handed over
from  a  gentleman  to  a  mendicant sailor  with  a  wooden  leg.  And  this  chance
remainder-man was perhaps some such specimen of inheritance… [FH 337-338]
20 The  whimsical  notion  that  the  remainder-man  might  be  a  mendicant  sailor  with  a
wooden-leg has the effect of bringing to the surface one connotation that inheres in that
legal  term—that  a  remainder-man may be  the  remains  of  a  man,  both déclassé  and
dismembered. (Harold Transome, as it happens, has just tried, and failed, to become a
member  of  Parliament,  “the  member  for  North  Loamshire”  [FH 200]).  But  still  more
interesting is the term’s silly iteration in these lines, both because of the adjectives that
are attached to it—this  alleged remainder-man,  the unconscious remainder-man,  this
chance remainder-man—and because of the noticeably arch syntactical construction that
is repeated along with the noun. No doubt this is the narrator’s irony, no doubt this is
style  indirect  libre,  but  these  recognitions  don’t  sufficiently  account  for  the  heavy-
handedness of the repetition here. We can begin to see what’s happening if we look at two
other points in the novel where the same note of arch irony prevails, sustained by the
same syntactical structure. One is a scene of lumbering humor in the butler’s quarters of
a great estate, the other a subsequent scene of practical joking—and the point in the
novel where the mechanics of its plotting seem most tendentiously implausible.
21 Chapter 7 contains several pages of conversational sparring below stairs, the boastings
and flightings of the butler and his friends, pages that allow George Eliot to entertain her
readers with “impressions” of popular speech while advancing the plot with bits of the
content of the exchanges. The narrator’s tone is amused and mock-heroic; the characters
are given—it isn’t immediately clear why—slightly allegorized family names: the butler is
Mr. Scales,  his  great  antagonist is  a  Mr. Christian,  and the  two are  allowed to  make
knowing puns about these names (“What would justice be without Scales?” asks Christian;
“…if you must talk about names”, replies Scales, “I’ve heard of a party before now calling
himself a Christian, and being anything but it” [FH 103]).  But what most sustains the
mock-heroic cast of the scene is the narrator’s penchant for a formulaic use of epithet:
“the great Scales,” “the reasonable Crowder,” “the too-ready Scales,” “the glib Christian,”
“the amazing Christian,” “the questionable Christian” (FH 100-104), It is all condensed
into three or four pages, and it is chiefly Christian, as if he had migrated from Pilgrim’s
Progress, who suffers this irony; and, although he appears frequently in the novel, he is
never again—with the exception of the one page I want to examine now—named in this
fashion.
22 But on that one page this parodic use of allegorical diction and syntax returns with a
vengeance  clustered  around a  bizarre  bit  of  comic  business—the  mock  castration  of
Christian by Scales. Some more information is needed here to take in the lines I’m about
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to quote. You must know that the discovery that Esther is a remainder-man, that she has
a claim on the Transome estate, depends on the transfer of yet another “loved object” (as
in SM 109): a locket in the possession of Christian must somehow come before the eyes of
Mr. Lyon, Esther’s adopted father. How is this exchange to take place, and how will it be
motivated? The short answer is: implausibly. The editor I alluded to above, who found the
novel’s complexity of plot unrewarding, had this to say about the scene in question: “The
way in which the plot  contrives  the loss  of  the locket  is  entirely unsatisfactory and
constitutes a major flaw of the work.” In fact, what is going on here is more interesting
than it is unsatisfactory. This is the contrivance. Mr. Christian must be unaware that he is
losing the locket: hence he, too—like the unfortunate Molly in Silas Marner—is made to
enjoy nipping at the opium bottle from time to time. He does so now, while returning
through the park of the estate, carrying in the hind-pocket of his coat the locket as well
as some important documents; he sits down to rest and dozes off. Enter Mr. Scales, out for
a walk with a  lady’s-maid,  Mistress Cherry,  and not averse to playing a trick on the
person whom the narrative now refers to first as “the sleeping Christian”, then, more
tellingly, as the “unconscious Christian”:
And  lo!  Here  was  the  offensive,  the  exasperatingly  cool  and  superior  Christian
caught  comparatively  helpless,  with his  head hanging on his  shoulder,  and one
coat-tail hanging out heavily below the elbow of the rustic seat.
It was this coat-tail which served as a suggestion to Mr. Scales’s genius. Putting his
finger up in warning to Mrs. Cherry, and saying, “Hush — be quiet — I see a fine bit
of  fun”  —  he  took  a  knife  from  his  pocket,  stepped  behind  the  unconscious
Christian, and quickly cut off the pendant coat-tail. (FH 144)
23 And Scales goes off, delighted with himself, imagining the “figure that […] the graceful
well-appointed Mr. Christian […] would cut” when he showed up at the manor with only
one coat-tail.  The  severed tail  he  throws away,  and the  papers  and locket  are  later
retrieved—how isn’t immediately relevant—and brought to Mr. Lyon.
24 So the  locket  passes  from the  person referred to  as  “the  unconscious  Christian”  to,
eventually, the person referred to as “the unconscious remainder-man,” in an exchange
that recapitulates the movement of the child Eppie from her opium-stupified mother to
Silas, frozen in his cataleptic trance. Two things are worth remarking here: first, the way
in which the characters’ “unconsciousness”, the suspension of all willed activity on their
parts, is accompanied by the most intense (and patently willful) activity of contrivance on
the part of the plotter of these novels;  and second, how the plot asks to be taken as
natural (as, in the words of the narrator, “a sequence as natural, that is to say, as legally-
natural, as any in the world” [FH 358]) at the same time that the text is drawing attention
to this process through the reiterated signs of disfiguration we have been dwelling on.
25 Finally,  it  is  time  to  return  to  the  matter  of  verbal  aggression.  The  cutting  of
Mr. Christian’s coat-tail is the first stop in a series of moves that eventually brings Esther
Lyon to the point where she can voice her claim to the Transome estate. The problem the
novel faces is how the voicing of that claim can be made to appear not merely legal (that
is,  a  consequence  of  the  workings  of  the  law  of  entail)  but  absolutely  innocent,
paradoxically at once voluntary and unwilled. This task is accomplished, not surprisingly,
through a split or doubled act of violence. Two men are killed during the election riot:
one, a constable, is knocked down by Felix Holt, who is thereupon tried for manslaughter;
the other person killed is an illiterate bill-sticker, the poor relation of the Transomes
whose death, according to the law of entail, activates Esther’s claim. Esther comes into
her own because of this killing, but whatever aggression on her part that might hint at is
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neatly displaced from one corpse to another. Esther doesn’t have to kill the man who
stands in the way of her inheriting;  the bill-sticker is crushed by the crowd and the
constable can then serve as a surrogate for the bill-sticker, when he is felled by Felix’s
deadly “arm” (FH 285, 320), the “member” that stands in for Esther. In this way she is
kept at two removes from the distant and unknown relative whose death she might well—
but  of  course couldn’t  and doesn’t—wish for.  Furthermore,  instead of  preferring her
claim, Esther gets to speak out in Felix’s behalf at his trial, and to speak in all innocence,
with quiet power and predictable effectiveness. Her intervention, she later learns, had
prompted a number of the county’s most influential gentry to act to have Felix’s sentence
commuted. “You made all the men wish what you wished” (FH 463), she is told, towards
the end of the novel, and we can take that sentence, in its slight abstraction, as recording
a working woman novelist’s characteristic wish as well.
26 Wishfulness is what animates contrivance; the novelist, then, may be thought of as one
more claimant or dispossessed remainder-man. But it is a commonplace that the realist
novelist, loudly or softly, disclaims responsibility for the events she purports to record. In
this respect she is less like the aggressive turkey-cock with whom we began than like the
thief in the old joke who, caught hiding in the henhouse when the owner of the farm
called out: “Anybody in there? Come out or I’ll shoot!” answered “Nobody here but us
chickens!” Nobody here but some characters and a narrator, is the novelist’s disclaimer.
And, oh, yes: some marks, too-just some black remnants or remainders.
27 It is time to ask, marks of what, remnants of what? What is it that the novelist’s claim of
innocence manages to not quite entirely conceal? What might she be thought to be guilty
of? I want to propose three pertinent answers to that question, arranged in a graded
series.
28 The  first  would  read  these  oddities  in  Eliot’s  text  as  indicating,  however  obliquely,
contradictions inherent in her ideological position, that of an apologist for the Victorian
middle-classes. I’m thinking here of two of the best historical studies of her writings,
Catherine Gallagher’s account, which sees Eliot as caught up in what she calls “the politics
of culture,” a system of hegemonic interests and claims also referred to by Daniel Cottom
as “the discourse of  the liberal  intellectual”.6 According to this  reading,  the novelist
might not indeed herself experience feelings of guilt; the “crimes”, and hence the bad
conscience,  would  be  society’s,  but  her  repeated  claims  of  disinterestedness  or
idealism would signal her own and her society’s difficulties in maintaining the coherence
of an ideological system.
29 We can accept these contextualizations of Eliot’s fiction and still wonder, first, what hold
a society has on the individuals who make it up, and, second, how the nature and strength
of  that  ideological  grasp  may  get  figured  in  fictions  depicting  the  aggressions  and
altruisms, the guilt and innocence, of individual agents. Here, a second account, drawn
from Freud’s  essay “Some Character-Types Met With in Psycho-analytic  Work”,7 may
prove  useful.  The  final  pages  of  that  essay  are  devoted  to  those  whom Freud  calls
“criminals from a sense of guilt,” people who either commit crimes or imagine that they
have done so, out of an “oppressive feeling of guilt.” Freud maintains that, “paradoxical
as it may sound, […] the sense of guilt was present before the misdeed,” that in fact “the
misdeed arose from the sense of guilt” and indeed provided some relief by attaching what
had  been  experienced  as  a  pervasive  and  indeterminate  guiltiness  to  a  particular,
namable crime. When Freud goes on to ask what the origin of “this obscure sense of guilt
might be, he claims that the invariable outcome of analytic work was to show that [it]
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derived  from  the  Oedipus  complex  and  was  a  reaction  to  the  two  great criminal
intentions of killing the father and having sexual relations with the mother.” That the
plot  of  Felix Holt should  turn  on  the  castration  of  Mr. Christian’s  coattails,  that  the
mysterious remainder-man should be momentarily imagined as “a mendicant sailor with
a wooden leg” and then discovered to be in fact a woman, these details, gratuitous in
their unpredictability, suggest that an oedipal thematics may indeed be at work shaping
the play of guilt and innocence in the novel.
30 Finally,  consider a third possibility,  this one raised by the work of the post-Freudian
analyst Nicolas Abraham. For Abraham, the “invariable outcome of analytic work” was
not the discovery in castration anxiety or in the Oedipus complex of irreducible uncaused
causes; rather he would see them as peculiarly recalcitrant myths, themselves capable of
further  analysis.  In  a  talk  entitled  “The  ‘Crime’  of  Introjection”8 Abraham proposes
another scenario to account for the pervasiveness of feelings of guilt that are attached to
no particular crime. He would trace the origins of guilt back to what he calls “the most
archaic stage in the constitution of the Ego”, the moment when the symbiosis between an
infant and its mother is broken, when the infant is obliged to take account of, as it were,
two mothers, an external object and its internalized or introjected double. This splitting,
Abraham believes,  is  the beginning of  what he calls la  duplicité and of  la duplicité’s
“acolyte, language.” He means duplicity in both its numerical and its moral senses—as
two-ness and as deviousness, as a loss of the simplicity of an innocent relation to the
mother.  (The  similarly  equivocal  term  in  Victorian  English,  a  term  frequently
encountered  in  Eliot’s  novels,  is  “doubleness”.)  For  Abraham,  a  guilty  awareness  of
doubleness is the inevitable result of every child’s accession to consciousness, to mental
representation  and to  language,  and it  precedes  and prompts,  rather  than conceals,
oedipal fantasies of parricide and incest.
31 Need we choose among these stories—for they are stories—of where guilt comes from,
when we turn back to Eliot’s fiction? I think not. Each can serve as a lens to bring aspects
of her language and plotting into focus. The particular strength of Nicolas Abraham’s
story-and the reason I  chose to place it  last  in the series—is that  it  seems to me to
resonate with the passages I  have been directing my attention to in Silas Marner and
Felix Holt. For these are novels that bring the question of the responsibilities of authorship
—the guilt or innocence of the novelist, the aggressive willfulness, or perhaps only the
will, inherent in plotting a story—into touch with a thematics of marking or incising that
so reframes that question that we are obliged, like Abraham, to put words like “guilt” or
“innocence” within quotation marks. Silas’s weaving, “like the spider, from pure impulse,
without reflection”, comes to serve as an emblem not for the innocence of authorship but
for its roots in a form of motion or agency to which words like activity or passivity, guilt
or innocence cannot do justice. That is not the only thing George Eliot has to say about
authorship, but it is nevertheless there to be read in her fiction.
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